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THE COMlvloN  MARKET  -  THE PERIOD  OF TRANSITION
Openlng Remanks  of  George W. Ball
Pantner, Cleany, Gottlleb,  Steen and Ball
4ootrr
befone  the
Meetlng  of  the  Natlonal  Industr-lal
Hotel  Commodor"e
New  Yonk Clty
Conf  er.ence  Board,  Inc.
If  any  of  you  had  llved  1n New yonk  1n  I-TBT  and had
ordered a load  of  cordwood  from  Connectlcut,  the  wagon  drlver
who hauled  1t  would have been stopped  at  the  New  york  bor.oer
and made  to  pay a customs duty.  rf,  &t  the  same  t1me, your
wlfe  had purchased some cabbages ln  New Jersey,  the  farmer
who banged them across  the  Hudson would have been met wlth
a slmllar  demand  fon  duty.  rf  1n those  days you had l1ved
1n the  commonwealth  of  vlrglnla  you would have thought  twlce
before  patnonlztng  other  than  your  home  state  merchants;
V1rgln1a  lmposed the  same customs dutles  on goods lmponted
from  hen slsten  states  as on goods lmponted from  across  the
sea.
This  was the  sltuatlon  among  the  thiz"teen  small
Amenlcan states  stnuggllng  for  a pnecanlous  llvtng  on the
Eastern  llttor,al  of  'Uhls eontlnent,  under" the  Artlcles  of
Confedenation  wc were on our  way towards  cneatlng  a Balkan5.zed
economy.  Had the  Foundtng Fathers  per"mltted  the  states  to
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dnlft  much  farther  as a loose  Confederation,  almost  centalnly
the  pnessures of  loea]  self-interest  would have hardened the
obstacles  to  the  free  flow  of  trade  lnto  a nlgld  tarlff
system.
But the  Foundlng Fathens -  who seem  to  thls  nostalglc
age so much  more perceptlve  than  todayrs  polltlclans  met
thls  trend  head on.  They necognlzed,, 1n t,he words of
Alexander Hamllton,  that
"An unrestralned  lntercourse  between  the
States  .  .  w111 advance  the  trade  of  each  .  .  .
lot  only  by  the  supply  of  neclpnocal  wants  at
home, but  for  expontatlon  to  forelgn  markets. "
And ln  draftlng  the  constltutlon  they  put  an end
fonever  to  smal1 dlscrlmlnatony  mankets on the  soll  of  the
Unlted  States.
Flrst,  langely  at  the  lnstance  of  James  Madlson, they
prohlblted  any of  our  states  from  lmposlng  dutles  on lmport,:
or  exports  wlthout  the  consent of  congress.  second, by a
delegatlon  to  the  fedenal  government of  such powers as il- r
powers to  tax,  to  coln  money  and to  regulate  intenstate
conmerce, they  paved the  way fon  a hlgh  degree  of  centnal
eontrol  oven economlc po11cy.  tr',lnaIly,  they  cres,ted a set
of  federal  lnstl,tutlons  to  see to  the  caruylng  out  of  all  the
antlcLes  of  t;he Constltuf lon.
I  have made  thls  bnlef  reference  to  our  Constltutlonal
hlstony  because lt  has pecullan  reLevance to  the  subJect  that3
we ane dlscusslng  today  -  the  European common  Market.  rn
draftlng  the  Tneaty  of  Rome, whlch  serves  the  Common  Market
both  as a  constltutlon  and a. code of  Laws, the  Europeans who
have brl11lantly  concelved anrl patlently  promoted the  ldea
of  the  common  Market qulte  self-eonsclously  borrowed these
prlnclples  of  our Federal  experlence.
Flrst,  they  provlded  ln  the  Tneaty that  the  six  member
countrles  whlch comprlse the  Economic communlty  must do away
wlth  all  barrlers  to  the  fnee movement  wlthln  the  Communlty
not  only  of  goods, but also  of  labor,  servlces  and capltal.
Thls  1s to  be progresslvely  accompllshed over  a transltron
penlod  of  12 to  Ij  yeans from January 1,  1958.
The pr1nc1pa1 obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  goods
are,  of  course,  lmport  quotas and taz.lffs.  rmpor.t quotas we:re
1n wlde operatlon  dunlng the  chaotlc  perlod  after  the  war,  but,
wlth  prosperlty  1n Eunope, they  are  deflnltely  on the  way out.
rrm sure you are  all  famlllar  wlth  the  steps  whlch the
European nations  have necently  taken  to  elimlnabe  dlscrlmlnatlon
agalnst  dollar  trade;  and r  can say wlth  confldence  that,
banrlng  economlc dlsasten,  quotas on 1ndustr,lal  products  wlI1
be ellmlnated  well  befone the  end of  the  transltlon  perlod  not
only  wlth  respeet  to  trade  pilthln  the  Cornmunlty  but  also  wlth
respect  to  tnade  between the  Communlty  countrles  and the  outslde
world,  lnc1udlng  the  Unlted  States.4
The Treaty  aLso  calls  for  the  prognesslve  elimlnatlon
of  tarlffs.  Here  agaln,  assumlng  a  contlnuing  hlgh  leveI  of
economlc  actlvlty,  I  thj-nk  lt  safe  to  predlct  that  the  intennal
tarlffs  on  the  movement of  goods wlthln  the  Communlty wl1l  be
elimlnated  substantlally  before  the  end of  the  transltlon
perlod.
Even  if  the common  Market were only a customs  unlon
whlch would be the  case lf  the  Treaty  dld  no more than provlde
for  the  ellminatlon  of  barrlens  to  the  fnee movement  of  goods
the  brlnglng  about of  that  customs unlon  would be bound to
cneate economlc  dlslocatlons.  The Treaty,  1n fact,  1s much
more than  that;  1t  pnovldes not  only  fon  the  fr.:e  movement  of
goods but  also  of  servlces,  labor  and capltal.  And the Member
countrles  of  the  common  Market  felt  that  they  could  not  take
such a revol-utlonany  step  wlthout  at  the  same  tlme  undertaklng
substantlal  measures of  economlc lntegratlon.  Thls,  tn  turn,
meant the  development of  certain  common  governmental policles.
politlcal  Content  ol  the  Community
As a nesult  they  agreed 1n the  Treaty  to  develop unlfled
pollcles  coverlng  a wlde spectrum of  governmental decislon.
They agreed,  for  example:
(1)  To worlr towards a common  flscal  and monetary pollcy;
(2)  To take  measunes  to  equallze  ilre  eondltlons  of  labon
at  an lnereaslngly  hlgh  Lever  and to  apply  the  prin-
clple  of  equal  pay for  equal  work  by men and women;5
(3)  To establrsh  common  nules  and negulatlons  gov-
ennlng car.tels  and monopolies;
(4)  To adopt a common  agrlcultunal  pollcy;  and
(5)  To undentake a common  commerclal polley
accordlng  to  a pneclse  tlmetable  and wlth
speclflc  goals  lnclud1ng  a common  tarlff
gover.nlng imports  fnom the  rest  of  the  world.
..
Th1s1savery1angeorder'Pnov1s1onssuchasthese,
1ffu11ycarn1edout,wou1dpushtheCommun1tyveryfantoward￿
economlc unlflcatron  and qulte  a way toward po1ltlea1  unlflca-  ,,
tton  as wel] o  ,
such an ambltlous  objectlve  could  not  be accompllshed  :
by easual  eonsuLtatlon  among  representatlves  of  the  slx  govern-
ments.  It  requlned the  cneation of  instltutlons  wh1ch, lt  1s  ,
.
hoped by many Europeans, mlght  become  the  genmlnal  lnstltutlorrs  , 
',.
thenue1eus,ofthegovennmentofafutuneUn1tedStatesof
Eunope  .
I  shall  not  attempt  here  to  descnlbe  these lnstitutions. 
,
IknowthatMr.LeonardTennyson1sgo1ngtota1kw1thyou
aboutthenthisafternoon.Isha11on1ysaythat1ngenena1
theyfo]1owthetn1part1ted1v1s1onofpowensw1thwh1chvte￿
'' are  famlllan  ln  oun own Govennment.  There  1s an Executlve  ..
Powen  lodged  ln  a  cr:runtrsslon,  a Judlelar  polvep  vegted  trn a  ,
Count that  has flna1  junlsdlctlon  to  decld,e all  legal  contno-  :
vensy arlsing  under  the  Tneatv,  and,  flnally,  a  panLlamentany  ,  .i:
Powen  entrusted to  an Assembly,  ,:
,  l:,.-:6
The  count  and  tlre  Assembl.y serve  not  only  the  European
Economl-c Conununlty but  also  the  two  other  Communltles  whlch
have  been establlshed  by  the  slx  member  natlons  the
European  coal  and  steel  communlty,  unden  which  a  common
market  has  been establlshed  for  coal  and  sbeeL,  and the
Eunopean Atomlc  Bner"gy commrsslon  (Euratom,  &s 1t  is  called),
which  establlshes  and admlnlsters  a  common  atomlc  pollcy  for
the  Six  Natlons.
These,  then,  are  the  el-ements of  the  common  Market
",  ;;":,:::'::":1,":;"",..:  ;:T:-.ff::,':;
goods, labor,  services  and capital,
,  o A provlslon  for  conmon  policles  coverlng
a broad spectrum of  governmental dec1slon.
".;,;,:,::T:T:il.::::T"::,:"::'::'il  :;,",
the Tneaty esbabllshes,.
Econoplc  Character  of  Memb,el:  .Qtates
Obvlously  a development of  such magnitude as the  Common
Market must have lmpontant  1mp1lcat1ons  not  only  for  Europe
but  for  the  whole wonld,  lncluding  the  unlted  states.  Apart
from  1ts  pollt1cal  mean1n65  and lts  contrlbutlon  to  str"engthenlng
the  dellcate  power baiance between the  west and East,  lt
certatnly  has practlcal  impllcatlons  for  Amenlcan  buslness.
rt  means the  creatlon  of  a gneat  new mass manket.  you
Amerlcan bttslness  leaders  may regard  lt  elther  as a new nenace-T
or  a new opportunlty,  dependlng on your  confldence  1n youn own
eompetltlve abllltles.
In  a mornent  I  shall  tny  to  be a llttle  mor4e  speclflc  about
these practlcal  lmpllcations.  Before dolng  so,  however, I  thlnlc
lt  may be helpful  to  have a bnlef  look  at  the  economj.c  character
and dlmensions  of  the  Common  Market  as  lt  appears today.
The Common  Market  (Chart  i)  conslstsr  &s you well  know,
of  s1x  countrles  France,  ltlest Germany,  Italy,  and the  so-calIeo
Benelux countrles  (eetglum,  The Netherl.ands, and Luxembourg).
Together  these natlons  have a land  area in  Europe that  is  ap-
proximately  one-eighth  the  area of  the  contlnental  Unlbed States
(Cnart  2).  But in  additlon  to  the  Common  Market proper,  one must
take  lnto  account those areas wlrlch are  assoelated  with  it  and
whlch,  under the  terrns of  the  Treaty,  have free  access fon  thein
pnoducts to  the  Common  Mar:]<et  (Cfrart 3).  Moreover, negotlatlons
are  beglnnlng  which  nray  r,rell result  ln  both  Greece and Turkey
havlng  speclal  arrangement of  assoclatlon.
Even wlthout  lts  assoclated  terrltonles  in  Afrlca  and
e1seurheretheCornmonMarkethasapopu1at1onofI65,oOo,ooo￿￿
veny nearly  equal  to  that  of  our  cotrntny (Chart  4).  However,
the  Gross Natlonal  Product  of  the  Common  lvtar'ket  countnles  1n
f957  the  last  year  fon  whlch  such flgurres  &re  available
was only  about  one-thlr.d  that  of  the  Unlted  States.  Ii-rt,  seven
years  bef  ore,  their  GNP  was only  one-t'ounth  that  of  oui'is  and
on the  basls  of  ptrchaslng  poiuen  1t  has been estlmated  that  the
f lgure  today  may be mor4e  neanly  one-half  than  one-thbd.Tlre strlklng  fact  about  the  Common  Market  countrles  1s
that  theln  economles have been developlng  at  a much,faster  tit"
than,our3  own.  rn  ttrls  chart  (cirart  F)  the yellow  llnes,  whlch
lndlcate  the  trend  of  the  lndex  of  lndustrlaL  productlon  for
the  Common  Market  countries,  show a steadlly  and steeply  rlslng
curve  durlng  the  last  elght  years.  rn  contrast,  the  blue  lines,
whlch  represent  comparable lndlces  for  the  Unlted  States,  show
substantlal  fructuatlon.  Thls  chart  beglns  wlth  the  year  Lgl)o,
slnce  by  that  tlme  the  European countrles  had more  than  negalned
the  leve1  of  productlon  they  had achleved  before  the  war.  Con-
sequently,  the  progress  slnce  1950 can be negarded as  real  and
not  merely  as maklng up for  war arrearages.
The pattern  of  development for  the  lndlces  of  lndustrlal
production  as  a whole  1s echoed by  the  lncllces  of  speclal  lndus-
trlal  sectors.  Fon manufacturlng  as a whole  and thls  dlffens.
from  tndustrlal  productlon  ln  that  1t  excLudes constructlon-
we flnd  the  same  phenomenon  of  a  steadlly  rlslng  curve  for  the
Common  Market  and a fluctuatlng  curve  fon  the  unlted  States.
The same  general  curve  ls  found  for  baslc  metals  and for  metal
products  (crrart  6).  rt  ls  arso  found even 1n the  case of  tex-
tlles,  a reratlvery  volatlle  lndustry  (chart  f),  and of  chemlcals,
deflnltely  a growth  lndustry.
{Ihene 1s another  clear  lndlcatlon  from  these  charts:  the
econornles of  the  S1x Gountrles  have been drrven  by  thetr  own
lntennar  englne  of  growth  rather  than  by  a  response  to  deveL-
opments ln  the  Unlted  States.  You w111 recall  that  ln  the
i  ::.:
i::..:1-lmmedlate  post-wan  years  1t  was fashlonable  to  say  that  1f  the
Unlted  States  were  to  eateh  eold,  Europe  would  catch  pneumonj-a.
what  has happened 1n 1953 and  1954,  and agaln  rn  LgiT  and  7958,
as  these chants  dlscIose,  suggests that  thls  ls  no longer  true.
vrlhen  the  united  states  caught  cold  in  those  years,  Europe
scarcel,y had the  snlffles.
To understand  the  extraordlnary  growth  of  the  economy
of  the  common  Market  countrles,  r  thlnk  1t  may be useful  to
look  at  what mlght  be called  the  relatlve  measure  of  effort
(crrart  B  )  .
The fLrst  half  of  thls  chart  shows the  lndex  of  flxed
capltal  formatlon,  uslng  7953 as 100.  Ihe  other  haLf  shows
flxed  capltal  formatlon  as a percentage of.Gross  Natlonal
Product.  the  blaek  llnes  show the  developments fon  the  Cornmon
Marlcet eountries.  fhe  green  l1nes  show what happened ln  the
Unlted States.
As you  see,  taklng  flxed  caplta1  formation  as  a per-
centage  of  GNP, the  flgures  in  195o for  the  common  Mar,ket
countnles  and the  unlted  states  were about  the  same  approx-
lmately  LT%, but  by  1957  the  rast  perlod  fon  whlch  these
flgures  are  avallable  the  unlted  states  was stilt  at  the
Lf/,  LeveS-, wh1le  the  figure  for  the  communlty countnles  was
well  over 2L%,
The ftnpresslve
and  the  hlgh  level  of
#
eeonomlc gnowth ghown
lnvestment  nalntalned
Bbese  chaz'ts
the latter  pant
by
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of  the  post-war  perlod  have  both  been  achlevecl  by  the  Six  coun-
.:
tnies  operatlng  wlthln  the  hamperlng envlronment  of  restrlcted
natlonal  mankets.  I  thlnk  lt  safe  to  predl.ct  trrat  the  Common
Market  w111 provlde  a vastly  gneater  economlc arrena ln  wrrtch
these  powerfuL  forces  of  grcrwth can make thernselves felt.  lr]hat
may resurt  and already  we ean see begJ"nnlng  slgns  of  lt
1s an exploslve  development comparable to  that  whlch  the  Unltecl
States  experlenced wlth  the  openlng of  the  West.
Int-e.r.e,s'u  fgr  Amerjlcal  Companles
Is  lt  any wonder then  that  Amer.lcan  producers  are  deter-
mlned to  play  a part  ln  the  development of  thls  new frontler?
I  need hardly  tell  you gentlemen  that  the  number of  Amerlcan
flrrns  that  are  now undertaking,  or  planning  to  undertake,  dlrect
lnvestment  in  the  Common  Market  ls  growlng  every  day,
Recentry  a  survey  was made of  the  lnvestment  plans  of
a selected  group  of  Amerlcan manufactunlng  f1rms.  Thls  survey
dlsclosed  that  1n the  years  L95T and 1958 more than  50%  ot
thetn  total  capltal  expendltures  abroad wene 1n Canada  and Latln
America,  whlle  less  than  4Qft were in  Europe.  But,  in  191-O,
these  eompanles are  planning  to  lnvest  47/￿ of  thelr  total
forelgn  capltal  expendltunes  ln  European countries.  Machinery
and  transportatlon  equlpment  were  the  manufacturlng  lndustrles
conoentratlng  most heavlly  on Eunopean  operatlons.  In  those
tndustries  the  GornBanle(l  reported  that  they  planned  to  spend
two-thkds  of  thelr  total  1960 ovenseas outlays  ln  Europe.11
I  am convlnced  that  the  major  lmpulse  for  thls  massl,Ve
movement  of  dlrect  lnvestment  to  Europe l1es  ln  the  deslre  of
Amerlcan buslness  to  share  the  frults  of  a rapidry  expandlng
economy  and to  pray  a part  ln  the  exploitatlon  of  a great  new
mass manket.  At  the  same time  many Arnerlcan lnclustrlallsts
have another  reason  for  seeklng  sources  of  productlon  ln  Europe,
They fear  that  unless  they  can manufactune  ln  the  communlty
they  may well  be excluded  from  the  common  Market,  for  1n its
operation  the  Treaty  w111 tend  to  penalize.the  manufactuner.
who rerles  on exportlng  from  the unlted  states.
Dlsad-vpn_tage  of  Amenlcan producer^s
Ittls  polnt  can be understoocl when we examlne thls  chart
(Chart  9),  whlch shows the overall  changes ln  the  tarlff  level
during  the  transltlon  perlod  of  LZ to  lJ  years,
As I  have stated,  under  the  terms of  the  Treaty,  the
tarlffs  that  appry  to  the  movernent  of  goods along  natlonal
llnes  wlthln  the  community  that  1s,  withln  the  area  of  bb.e
slx  countrles  must be redueed to  zero by  the  end of  the
transltlon  perlod,  orr  1n other  words,  by  the  end of  1969 and
not  later  than  the  end of  1921.  But  a dlfferent  rule  applles
wlth  respect  to  tarlffs  lmposed on shlprnents from  outslde  the
Communlty.  llfie  so-caIled  external  tarlffs  of  ti:re Communlty are
not  to  be neduced to  zero  but  are  to  be progresslvely  lncreased
(or  decneaserl as  the  ease may be),  so  that  they  neach a common
level  by  the  end of  the  tn6nsltlon  penlod.  -thls 
corfliion  leveLt2  -  .,. ,  ', 
.
the  conlmon  extertral  tarlff,  as  lt  ls  calred  --  ls  flxed  at  the
arlthmetlca1  averaages  of  the  tanlffs  ln  effect  1n the  dlfferent
Communlty  countrles  on January  L,  LgjT.  :
r  need not  labon  the  impllcarlons  of  thls  chart.  The
AmerLcan  producer  must neallstlcally  face  the  probablllty  that,,
as  the  Common  Mar"ket comes lnto  being,  hls  exports  to  the  Conrmon
Itlarket  countrles  wLll  be subJect  to  tarlffs  that  may be sub-
stantlally  hlgher  than  tarlffs  now ln  effect,  whlle  competlng
producer"s wlthln  the  Common  Market  wlll  be able  to  sell  to  the
same  customers with  no tarlffs  at  aIl.
Of course,  lt  1s not  at  all  centaln  that  the  sltuatlon
w111 be as  serlous  as many manufacturers  presently  see lt.
Already  the  officlals  admlnisterlng  the  Common  Market  have shown
thelr  deslne  to  wonk towards  a Community tarlff  poIlcy  as liberal
as possible  wlth  the  outslde  wor1d.  Itrey have shown thelr  de-
terminatlon  not  to  let  the  Common  Market become  a restrlctlve..
tradlng  bloe,  but  to  use it  as a force  1n brlnglng  about a gen-
eral  reductlon  ln  trade  barrlers  throughout  the  world.
fhus,  when the  flrst  step  was taken  towards  creatlon  of
the  common  Market  on January  1,  rg5g,  the  tanlff  neduc;1ons
were  extended  not  onl.y  to  the  members of  the  Comrnon  Mar1<et, but
to  all  the  members of  the  General  Agreement on  Tanlffs  and Trade
(trre  GATT), of  whlch  the  united  states  is  a nenber,  and tt  ls
Ilke1y  that  the  reductions  1rr the  next  step  w111 be s1mllar1y
extended.  unden the  r;,ew  amendments  to  the  Reclprocal  Tnade
': il ,:f
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Agneements  Act,  negotlatlons  are  to  be undertalcen looktrng towand
the  pnogr:esslve neductlon  on a neclprocal  basls  of  the  common
extennal  tarlff  of  the  common  Manket.  Thene ls  sentlment  in
the  common  Manket countri-es  fon  an addltlonal  reductlon  once
thls  flnsb  negotlatlon  1s completed  provlded,  of  course,
we and the  othen  rnajon lndustnial  countrles  outslde  the  S1x
are prepar.ed to  negotlate  funther  on a reclprocal  baslg.
Neventheless,  Amerlcan prod.ucers who do not  have sources
of  pnoductlon  wlthin  the  comrnon  Market  will  undoubtedly  flnd
themseLves  at  some  tnade dlsadvantage.  For  that  reason Arnerlcan
flrms  have an lncentlve,  over and above the  oppontunltles  whlch
the  common  Manket offers,  to  extend  thelr  openatlons  into  the
communlty 1n such a way as to  achleve  an equal  footlng  wltir
other  Common  Manket producens.
You gentremen, thenefone,  are  golng  to  have to  make
some  hand declslons  lf  you want to  establlsh  a posltlon  1n the
Common  Market,  malntaln  an exlstlng  pos5.t1on or  expand lt.
The natune  of  the  problenr whlch  each of  your  ffums  wlrr  face
depends to  conslderable  extent  upon the  degnee to  whleh it  has
already  comrnltted ltself,  or  ls  prepaned to  commlt ltse-f,  to
produce  ln  the  European Economlc Communlty.
Fjrrms Exportlng  to  one on=Mgne  communlty countnles
Let  us  take  flnst  the  case of  a flrm  tha,t  has
tlon  facllltles  1n the  common  Manket but  whlch has an
no produc-
establlshed
::l:export  trade  wlth  one or  more Common  Market  countrles.  If  your
pnoduct  ls  pnesently  exported  to  a  row tanlff  country  such as
Belglumr  vou may have  to  pay an lncreaslng  tar"lff  as  steps  are
taken  toward  achlevlng  the  anlthmetlcal  avenage.  On the  oiher
hand,  lf  you are  pnesently  exportlng  to  a hlgh  tanrff  oolrniry
such as tr'nance, you may enJoy some  reductlon  1n  barLtf  but  you
wlll  stllL  be at  a dlsadvantage slnce  your  competltors  wlthln
the  common  Manket w111 ultlmately  face  no tanlff  at  arl.
F'lrms that  Do Not r'li *!o  the  Communlty and Lleense  Local
A second case ls  where you do not  export  to  the  Communlty
but  llcense  local.  producers.  you must rnake  sure  that  your
llcensees  are  advantageously  placed  1n the  Communlty  and ade-
quately  equlpped wlth  plant,  management  and flnanclng  so  that
they  can serve  a market  approachlng  ln  slze  our  olrn Amerlcan
marke  t.
rf  you have llcensees  ln  more than  one country  wlthln
the  communlty you must declde  between them.  you may aryange
for  the  strongest  to  take  over  the  whole market.  you may even
declde  to  arrange  a merger of  your  llcensee  flrms.
In  many cases you w111 face  legal  problems of  soiiie eom-
plexlty  especlally  1f  you seek to  termlnate  tlcenses  and fran-
chlses  already  granted.
Flnally,  because of  the  scale  of  the  myket,  you may
declde  to  abandon your  system of  llcenslng  and to  undertake
dlrect  lnvestment.
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Flnms wlth  productlon  ln  Qnty One Communlty  Coun
rf  youn f lnm.'produces tn  only  one country  1n the  com-
munlty  but  sells  throughout  the  Communlty  you rnay  dlseover  that
more advantageotls pr'cductlcn  sltes  al'e avallable  ln  obner  Corn-
munlty  countrleis  as  the  common  Manket eomes  lnto  belng.  The
effect  of  the  Common  Market w111 be to  abolish  discrlminatory
tax  and soclal  policles  and,  therefore,  to  make  the  selectlon  of
the  countny  depend to  a mueh gneaten  extent  on natural  advantages
such as raw matenlals  and l_abor supply.
Flr.ms I'rlth  Ivlere  Than One operatlon  ln  the  communlt
ff  you have more than  one plant  ln  the  Common  Market  you
may wlsh  to  combine  productlon  1n a single  communlty  plant.
where speclal  pnoblems, such as the  hablts  and tastes  of  a par-
ticular  countr"y ane 1nvolved,, lt  may stlll  be posslble  to  pnoduce
varlous  types  and speclflcatlons  of  pr.oduct 1n one plant  to  sult
those trablts  and tastesr  oF alter"natively,  to  have special  as-
sembly. operatlons  1n varlous  countrles  of  the  communlty.
These are  only'  brief  indlcatlons  of  some of  the  pnoblems
whlch  the  Common  Manket ralseg  for  Amerlcan buslness.  If  youn
company  1s golng  to  make a ratlonal  declslon  negarding  1ts  p1an.s
for  the  Common  Marl<et lt  w111 have to  tal<e lnto  account  a great
numben  of  complex problems whlch  w1ll  dlffer  fnom one flrm  to
anothen,  dependlng on the  nature  of  the  lnCustry  and the  posltlon
of  that  flrm  wlthln  the  lndustry.  Generallsatlons  are  not  of
much val.ue and the  best  counseL r  can glve  any of  you  ls  that  you
should  ava1l  younserf  of  the  most  expernt ad,vlce  and rnai<e  no-16
declsi-ons untll  you have studlecl your  lndlvldual  pnoblem'wlth
fan  gneater  care  than you would glve  to  a declslon  wlth  nespect
to  expansion ln  the  Unlted  States  manket.
The probLem  1s furthen  compllcated  by the  fact  that  the
European Common  Manket presently  conslsts  of  only  s1x  countrles
1n Western Eunope and that  seven other  natlons  have bnought lnto
belng  a  eompetlng tradlng  area  known as  the  Free  Tnade Assocla-
t1on.  You w111 hean much  more of  thls  1n the  course of  the
day but  it  may be usefur  for  me to  speak briefly  about thls
contnoverslal  questlon  by way of  backgnound.
Th.e-  FtS:e ,Trade Ar.ea
The European Economlc Communlty (tne  Common  Manket) was,
as you know, not  the  first  Eunopean conmunlty"  The coal  and
steel  communlty, comprlslng  the  same  slx  natlons,  has been an
operatlng  reallty  for  seven years,  and the  Slx  natlons  of  thls
communlty have acqulned  experlence  in  wonklng together.  Never-
theLess,  when the  proposals  for  a European Common  Market v,'ere
frnst  serlously  put  forward  ln  1956, the  hope was stlll  ex-
pressed  that  the  unlted  Klngdom and certaln  othen  European
countnles mlght see flt  to  jo1n.
Howeven, &s r  cannot  too  stnongly  emphaslze,  the  domlnant
put3pose  of  the  common  Market  was polltlca1.  Its  founders  in-
tended  1t  as a step  toward  lntegnatlon,  towand unlflcatlon,
ultlmatery  toward  the  creatlon  of  a unlted  states  of  Eunope.
Wlthout  thls  deep mot";Lvatlng convletlon  they  wourld never' have17
gone forward  wlth  the  Cornmon  Market.  Ihe  member  natlonsr,Would
never  have  taken  tlre great  nlsks  of  dlslocatlon  and dlsruptLon
that  such a  revolublonary  step  1mpl1ed had 1t  not  been for  the
po1ltlcaI  drlve  behind  the  ldea  of  unlflcatlon.
For  that  reason,  they  lnslsted  that  the  Treaty  provlde
not  merely  for  the  ellmlnati-on  of  bamlers  to  trade  but  that
1t  eontaLn the polltlcal  content  and establish  the polltleal
lnstliutlons  that  I  lrave descrlbed  earller  thls  aftennoon.
Not  all  of  the  European natlons,  however,  were prepaned
to  embrace such a  step  toward polltlcal  unlflcatlon.  ftre
Austrlans  felt  hesltant  to  do so beeause  of  thelr  treaty  com-
mltments  wlth  bhe Sovlet  Unlon  and the  Austrlan  Sociallst
Party  was troubled  by memorles of  the  A$schlus.s wlth  Germany
unlflcatlon  forced  by mllltary  mlght.  The swlss  felt  obllged
to  reJeet  pol1tlcal  lnvolvements  beeause  of  theln  hlstorle
po11cy of  neutnaltty,  and to  some  extent  thls  same  loglc  ln-
fluenced  the  swedes.  Great  Britatrn,  elearly  the  leader  of  the
nations  whlch  abstalned  fr,om jolning  the  common  Market,  was
also  haunted by hlstorlc  pollc1es.  Great Brltaln  made  lt  qulte
clear  that  she would  be prepared  to  partlclpate  only  ln  a  verv
llmlted  forrn of  cooperation  wlth  the  Eur.opean  countrles.  Cer-
talnly  she would have no part  ln  even the  most Llmlted  step
toward  a polltlcal  unlon  that  lnvolved  a derogatlon  of  sov-
erelgnty.
The late  Professor  Andre Slegfrled  once remanked that
Great  Erltaln  was llke  a Slrtp.  nroored ln  Europealr waters  but-LB
always readv to  salr  away  at  a momentrs  notlce.  centatrnrv the, 
:
Brltlsh  people
have regandecl  and eontlnue  to  regarcl themselves not  as a :part  of
Europe so much as a center  of  a worldwlde  comnronwealth  -sf nations.
Yet  the  fact  could  not  be lgnored  that  the  comlng lnto
belng  of  the  Common  Market  cneated  for  Great  Brltain  and for  all
of  the  penlphenal  countrles  a serlous  pnoblem.  They could  not
accept  with  a happy mien  the  commenclal disadvantages  whlch
non-membershlp 1n the  common  Market  mlght  invoLve.
For  that  reason Great Brltaln,  even before  the  slgnlng
of  the  common  Market  rreaty,  put  forth  a proposal  for  a Free
Trade Area whlch  would  lnclude  not  only  the  countrles  of  the
common  Market  but  all  the  perlpheral  European natlons  1n
fact,  all  of  the  rr  nations  of  the  organlzatlon  for  European
Economlc cooperatlon.  Thi.s Free  Trade Area pnoposal  was aban-
doned when negotlations  wlth  the  Common  Market  countrles  flnally
broke  down 1n November  of  lasb  year.  But  for  tactlcaL  reasons
a newr more llmited  scheme  has now been agreed on by  seven of'
the  countnles  on  the  perlphery  of  the  common  Market,  the  so-
ealled  "outer  sevenr' --  the  unlted  Klngdom, sweden, Nonway,
Denmank,  Austr'la,  swttzerland  and portugal.  rtrese countrLes
have lnltlated  a  Treaty  calllng  for  the  creatlon  of  a Free  Tnade
Assoclatlon.  Internal  tarlffs  would  be ellrnLnated  throughout
the  anea of  the  countrles  Jolnlng  the  Assocla.tion.  The steps
toward  the  reductlon  of  these  tarlffs  would  be  phased  to  keep
pace wlth  the  steps  tolverd  ttre  ellmtnatLon  of  the  Snterna]
tanlffs  wlthln  bhe Common  Market..:.. 
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cleanly,  the  pnoponents of  the  stockholm  Treaty  hope
that  1t  w111 keep open a doon  and 1n faet  w1ll  generate
pressure  for  an ultlmate  rnenger  of  the  Commgn  Ma.rket ano
the  Free  Trade Assoclatlon,  thus  flna-lly  achleving  the  Free
Trade Area orlglnarly  proposed by  Great  B.italn.
Dlfference  Between  Free Trade Assoclatlon
and  Comrnon  Manlce  t
Llke  the  Free  Trade Anea,  the  Fnee Trade Associatlon
1s purely  a cofiunercial arcangement.  rt  1s 1n no sense a  step
toward pollt1cal  unlficatlon.  But  there  1s another  polnt  ln
whlch  it  dlffers  slgnlficantry  from  the  common  Manket.  The
natlons  that  are  members  of  the  Fnee Trade Assoclatlon  would
not  be bound to  wonk toward a common  external  tarlff.  Each
would be free  to  talror  lts  own commerclar po11cy toward  the
outslde  wor'1d so as  to  galn  the  maxlmum  natlonal  Edvantage.
r  need hardly  polnt  out  that  this  would be bound to  re-
sult  ln  formldable  technlcal  and adminlstnatlve  cllfflcultles.
Elabonate  measuries  would have  to  be  taken  to  prevent  goo.Js
from  enterlng  the  Area  through  that  eountry  having  the  lowest
external  tarlff.
But  apart  from  thls,  the  refusaL  to  agree  to  the  prln-
clples  of  a conmon  external  tarlff  makes the  problem of  ultl-
mately  combinlng  the  Free  Trade  Assoclatlon  a,:-rd  the  Common  Market
extremely  dlfflcult.  In  such a cornblnatlon  tlre Free  Tnade Anea
countrles  would enJoy *ll  the  commenclal advantages of  free20
aceess to  the  Communlty  wh11e shunnlng  the  pollttcal  responsl-
bllities  whlch  the  Communlty  lmposes  and thj.s  would  certalnly
be unpalatabl"e  to  the  supporters  of  the  Common  Market.  Under
a Free Trade Anea, Great Brltaln  ln  particular  would stand  to
galn  lmmense  advantag€s,  for  she would  serve  as  the  nexus of
two  tnadlng  systems,  the  Brltlsh  commonwealth  and the  Free
Trade Area,
The lmpllcatlons  of  thls  last  polnt  can be best  seen ln
relation  to  the  lnvestment  declslons  of  Amenlean  companles.
Thene ls  no doubt  that  were a Fnee Tnade Area to  come  into
belng  1n the  form  orlglnally  proposed  by the  unlted  Klngd.om,
a lange  share  of  Amerlcan direet  lnvestment  now flowlng  lnto
the  common  Market wourd be dlnected  to  the  unlted  Klngdom.
Producers  1n the  unlted  Klngdom would  enjoy  the  best  of
both  worlds  pnefenentlal  access to  the  commonwealth  and
fnee  access to  the  tr'nee  Trade Area.
The Pnqblem for  Amerlca
Amerlcan flnms  have found  the  pnospect  of  these  competlng
tnadlng  areas  a sounce of  confuslon  and compllcatlon.  ?hls  has
aLso been true  of  the  unlted  states  Government.  Durlng  the
entil"e  perlod  of  controversy  betweerr tlie  pnoponents of  the
Free  Tnade Area  and the  Common  Market,  our  Government has  quite
wlsely,  r  belleve,  assumed  a postune of  benlgn neutnallty.  The
encouragenlent of  measlrres looklng  towand the  polltlcal  and
economtc lntegnatlon  of  Eunope has long  been part  of  oun natlonal
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pollcy.  Thls  pollcy  has been d,eclared not  only  by,succes'sLve
Amer'lcan Adrnlnlstnatlons  but  by  the  Congress.  eulte  naturally,
thenefone,  our Government  has conslstently  expressed its  support
fon  the  European common  Manket,  just  as  lt  expnessed,  support
for  the  coal  and steel  communlty whlch  came lnto  belng  elght
years ago.
Whlle  f  am j-n no posttlon  to  speak for  the  Adminlstratlon,
I  thlnk  lt  clear  that  most Amerlcans would have been happler  if
other  European natlons  had Jolned  wlth  the  S1x ln  the  creatlon
of  the  common  Market.  At  the  same tlme,  oul3  Govennment  is
hardly  1n posltlon  to  oppose the  Free Trade Assoclation  so long
as  it  ls  wlthln  the  fnamework of  the  GATT  the  GeneraL Agree-
ment on Tariffs  and Trade  to  vrhlch all  majon trnee Wonld tradlng
natlons  subscrlbe.  As 1t  is  now wrltten,  the  Stockholm Treaty
whlch ls  the  organlc  document  of  the  Free Tnade Assoclatlon
should  succeed ln  meeting the  GATT  nequlrements.
In  recent  months many Amenlcans have become  concerned
by two posslbllltte,s.  One ls  that  competltlon  between these
two  tnadlng  areas  might  dlstort  natunal  tradlng  pattenns  and
even perhaps  result  1n a llmlted  form  of  economlc warfane  that
couLd prove po1ltlca11y  divlslve  fon  the  Western alLiance.  The
second ls  that  the  two gloups  mlght  brldge  iihelr  dlfferences
by  extendlng  to  the  Common  Market  the  commer:cj.al  arrangements
embodled ln  the  tr'ree Tnade Assoclatlon,  wlthout  a  correspondlng
extensLort of  the  poJ.ltical  obl"lgatlons  eontatned  in  the  eommon
Manket rneaty.  Amerlcan concenn has been aggnavated by  the22:
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dlstunbing  magnltude of  our. overall  balance of  payments'dgflelt
wlth  the  gold  outflow  that  has nesulted.
The Par.ls Meetlng
rt  was tn  part  beeause of  thls  gnovrlng coneern that
Mr'  Douglas Dillon,  the  Under:-Secnetar.y  of  State.for  Economlc
Affalns,  annanged  to  meet last  week with  a speclal. Economlc
Commlttee, whlch lncluded  representatlves  of  the  member  states
of  the  common  Market  and the  Free  Trade  Assoclatlon,  BS well
as a representatlve  of  the  Eunopean  Economlc Commlssion.  The
unlted  states  made clear  at  thls  meetlng  that  Amerlca had a
very  real  stake  1n the  shape and natune  of  the  commerelal
policles  developed among  the  s1x and the  seven, and that  we
could. not  contemplate  wlth  pleasure  any arrangements between
the  members  of  those  groups  that  nlght  nesuLt  1n unwarranted
dlscrlmlnation  agalnst  unlted  States  prod.ucts.  At  the  same
time,  oul3  reprresentatlvee  made clean  that  the  indr.rstrlallze,f
natlons  of  Europe should  play  a  langer  rol-e  in  provldln.g  capltal
for  the  undendeveloped,  natlons.  F'lnally,  we advocated the
creatlon  of  a new onganizatlon  for  economlc consultatI.on  !n
whlch  the  unlted  states  and canada wourd,  fully  partlclpate.
As a result  of  thls  meetlng,  a commlttee of  four  I'wlse
men",  lncluding  a repr4esentatlve  of  the  unlted  states,  has been
lnstnucted  to  draw up the  plans  for  the  new organlzatlon.
Meanwhile,  worklng  parttes  are  belng  apBolnted  to  sturdy the
problems  of  co-exlstence  ralsed  by the  common  Manket and the23
F'ree Tnade Assoclatlon  as well  as the  relatlonshlp  of  those
organlzatlons  to  the  multllateral  trade  prlnc1.p1es whl'ch are
Iald  down ln  GATT,
f  cannot over-emphaslze the  importance of  the  dlscusslons
ln  Parls  last  week.  The declslons  reached at  the  meetlng
represent,  I  belleve,  a new  and wlse inltlatlve  1n Amerlcan
pollcy  an lnlttatlve  alrnost as important,  perhaps,  &s that
whlch  produced the  Marshall  Plan  or  the  North  Atlantlc  Treaty
Organlzatlon.  For  the  flrst  tlme  oun Eunopean  allles  w111 be
meettng negularly  wlth  us to  dlscuss  our  common  economlc pnob-
lems on the  basis  of  complete equaltty,  For  the  flr.st  tlme
vie shall  be wonklng wlth  our  allles  to  achleve  the  klnd  of
hanmony  ln  the  anea of  economlc po1lcy  that  lve have long  sought
to  achleve  through  NATO  1n the  area of  defense.
Pnecj-sely what may develop from  these dlscusslons  1s
hard  to  tell  at  the  moment.  fn  the  long-nange Lnterests  of
the  Unlted  States,  our  objectlve  should  be not  to  try  to  brlng
the  Slx  and Seven togethen  1n a  common  tradlng  bloc,  lrhlch
mlght  only  lncrease  the  trade  dlsadvantage  of  the  Amenlcan
producer,  but  rather  to  aehleve  a gneater  and greater  degnee
of  freedom for  trade  vrhlle  at  the  same tlme  encouraglng  the
natlons  of  Europe to  extend their  exlstlng  commenclal  relatlon-
shlps  l.nto broader  aspects  of  economlc and Bo1ltIcal  lntegratlon.
These general  suggestlons  as to  the  directlon  of  our
natlonal  polley  may seem  of  llttle  pnaetleal  use to  you
gentlemen who ane faced  wlth  hand buslness  declslons  of  tradlng24
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and lnvestment.  Ert  a sense'of  what oun Government ls  seeklng
to  achleve must necessanll.y pray  a pant  ln  these deelsl:ons.  .
In  vlew  of  recent  developments ln  the  evolutlon  of  oplnlon  on
both  sldes  of  the  Atrantlc  r  would not  necommend  that  you
rnake  your  polleles  on the  assumptlon  that  the  natlons  of  the
tr'ree Trade  Assoclatlon  and the  Common  Manket are  11keIy  soon
tofonmacommontnadtnganea.Ith1nk1tmuchmore11ke1y
thatthe1r"d1fferencesw111bereso].vedbypragmat1cso1ut1ons
to  a long  serles  of  speclflc  problems and,  r  slncenely  hope, 
'
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by a gneater  and greater  progress  towand tnade  llberaLlzatlon 
.
among  all  the  natlons  of  the  Free  World.